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The Communist Party of India came into power in Kerala in 1957 during one of the tensest 
periods of the Cold War. Introducing landmark legislation on land, education and 
administration, the initiatives of the Communist ministry in Kerala provoked vested interests in 
countering Soviet influence in the region, thus making India a main theatre of the Cold War in 
South Asia. Efforts to counter the Communist ministry's political inroads in Kerala from within 
the country came to be known as the 'liberation struggle', which ultimately succeeded with the 
dismissal of the ministry. However, the ouster was part of a US-backed campaign of 
containment of communism in Asia. This paper explores how US-based agencies overthrew 
the democratically elected government in Kerala with the backing of Union Congress ministers 
and with the aid of the Indian Intelligence Bureau. 
 
 
The cessation of the Second World War saw Soviet Russia and the United States of 
America follow two very different ideological paths. Soviet Russia embodied a world-
vision shaped around socialism, and America clamoured for a democratic capitalist 
political economy. These two colossal states either drew into their fold, or forced 
alignments by other nation states, precipitating an ideological war on a global scale that 
came to be known as the Cold War. The new post-war world order soon determined 
much of international politics until the late 1980s. The establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China by a Communist government with close political and military ties to 
the Soviet Union brought the Cold War into the Asiatic region. Consequently, fearing for 
its economic and strategic interests in the region, the US reacted by introducing a policy 
of containment of Communism similar to that which had already existed in Europe. Thus, 
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from 1949 onwards, East and Southeast Asia became the second most important 
battleground in the forty-four-year Cold War (1947-1991). 
 
The anti-communist ministry operations of the US   
In India, the unprecedented success of the Communist Party in elections held in 1952, 
both to the Lok Sabha and the state Legislative Assemblies, was especially alarming to 
the United States. The Communist Party emerged as the largest opposition party in the 
Lok Sabha by winning 3.3 percent of votes and sixteen seats1. The position of the party 
in the Lok Sabha was further improved by the seats won by its electoral allies. These 
included the People’s Democratic Front from Hyderabad with seven seats, and the 
independent Communists running on the ticket of the United Front of the Leftists with 
three seats from Travancore-Cochin. Thus, the Communist Party of India controlled 
twenty-six seats in the Lok Sabha opposing the Congress Party which controlled 364 
seats2. In the elections held to the State Legislative Assemblies across the country in 1952, 
the Communist Party won 4.38 percent of total votes3. 
The anxiety of the US government over the growth of Communism in India was 
articulated by Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, when speaking before the House of 
Representative’s Foreign Affairs Committee, on 20 March 1952. He suggested that if this 
trend should continue they would have a growth of Communist strength in India and a 
very dangerous situation in Asia4. The US feared that if India turned toward Communism, 
and with it possibly a major part of Asia, the strategic balance of power between the East 
and the West would register an important shift. 
The emergence of Communist Party as a majority party in the elections held to the 
Kerala State Legislative Assembly in 1957, and the doubling of the popular votes of the 
Communists from five percent in 1951-52 to ten percent in 1957 elections intensified the 
fear of the government of the USA.5 The US government observed that economic and 
political instability would make India vulnerable to Communism. It was because of this 
that the Congress Party in Kerala lost in 1957 and the Communists won the election.6  
The Operations Coordinating Board of the US calculated that the Communists were able 
to form a government after the 1957 elections because the other political parties in the 
state had been divided and engaged in in-fighting amongst themselves. In addition, 
                                                
1 Election Commission of India, Report on the First General Elections in India 1951-52, Vol. II, p11. 
2 Victor M. Fic, Peaceful Transition to Communism in India, Bombay, 1969, p57. 
3 Election Commission of India, op. cit., p189. 
4 Victor M. Fic, Peaceful Transition to Communism in India, op. cit., p 60. 
5 Memorandum from the director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Bartlett) to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Rountree), Document 175, South Asia, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1987.    
6 National Intelligence Estimate, Document 217, South and Southeast Asia, Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1992. 
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general apathy towards the election caused a relatively small voter turnout.7 In a 
memorandum sent by Henty Lodge Jr., Representative at the United Nations, to Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, then US President, on 21 February 1958, Lodge mentioned that the 
fundamental cause of the Communist success was because Kerala had the highest literacy 
of any state in India and that it therefore had a large number of educated people who 
had no jobs.8 But a telegram from the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting in 
Manila to the Department of State in Washington, dated 12 March 1958, stated that the 
growth of Communism in India was largely due to New Delhi’s acceptance of Moscow 
propaganda, patronage of 'Commie' front organizations, and acceptance of some 270 
million dollars of Soviet aid.9  
The first official confirmation of the intervention of the US in Kerala affairs came from 
Daniel Patrick Moinihan, US Ambassador to India in the early seventies. Through his 
work 'A Dangerous Place' he mentioned that the US had twice, but only twice, interfered 
in Indian politics to the extent of providing money to a political party.10 He further stated 
that both times this was done in the face of a prospective Communist victory in a state 
election, once in Kerala and once in West Bengal where Calcutta was located, and both 
times the money was given to the Congress Party which had asked for it.11 He added that 
it was given once to Indira Gandhi herself, who was then a party official. 
While this revelation was made public, Ellsworth Bunker, US Ambassador to India 
during 1957-61, gave an interview to the Centre for Oral History at Columbia University 
on 18 June 1979, affirming that the US Government had given financial assistance to the 
Congress Party on the presumption that the Russians were putting money into the 
Communist Party of India, as they did elsewhere. However, he was not sure whether the 
assistance had gone through Indira Gandhi.12 The principle of assistance had the approval 
of Washington, and Ambassador Bunker was given discretionary power as to how it 
might be used and in what amounts. Bunker recollected that S.K. Patil, the Union 
Minister, was the intermediary in that situation.13   
                                                
7 Operations Coordinating Board, Special Report: Exploitation of Kerala Elections, Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952-61, White House Office, OCB Series, Box 3, Kerala 
Elections (India), Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, Kansas, USA. 
8 Memorandum from the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to US President Eisenhower, 
Document 216, Foreign Economic Policy, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. IV, Office 
of the Historian, US Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991. 
9	Telegram from the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State, Document 4, 
East Asia–Pacific Region; Cambodia and Laos, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XVI, 
Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1992.	
10	Daniel P. Moynihan and Suzanna Weaver, A Dangerous Place, New York, 1978, p41.	
11	Ibid.,	41.	
12	Interview with Ellsworth Bunker, US Ambassador to India 1957-61, by Ridney Jones on 18 June 1979, 
Centre for Oral History, Columbia University, New York, USA, pp 75-80.	
13	Ibid.		
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Bunker testified that the Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA) of the US very 
closely worked with the Intelligence Bureau in India. He revealed that the relations 
between CIA and IB were very good and very close, and the former was able to get 
through the Indian Intelligence people pretty good evidence as to what was being spent, 
on what, and in what amounts.14 He further mentioned that the anti-Communist 
operations of CIA in India were largely in collaboration with the authorities in India. The 
tactic was to attract the intervention of the government of India in Kerala affairs through 
large scale political propaganda and agitations.15  
Dennis Kux, American Foreign Service Officer in US Embassy in India, through his 
autobiography 'Estranged Democracies, India and the United States 1941-1991', 
expressed that the lesson Washington drew from the Communist success in Kerala was 
that the economy failed to improve rapidly enough to satisfy the expectations of the 
people.16 He added that experts in the United States feared that if Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
Indian Congress Party failed to achieve adequate economic growth in the country, the 
strength of the Communist alternative vision would continue to expand, presenting a real 
danger17. He recalled that the prevention of additional Keralas was an important 
argument for augmenting US assistance to India. 
The United States government thus feared the successful working of the Communist 
government in Kerala because it would give the Communists an important foothold for 
further expanding in India, and would also enhance their respectability and prestige as a 
parliamentary political party. This, in-turn, had far-reaching implications for the rest of 
Asia, and certainly signalled advantage to proponents of international Communism18. It 
thus, in a sense, forced the hand of the US government in expanding anti-communist 
activities in Kerala. The operations of the US government in Kerala were on a modest 
scale consisting of a United States Information Services Library at Trivandrum, and two 
International Cooperation Administration employees engaged in agricultural education 
and research work19. The job of USIS was to avoid the charges in Kerala, and elsewhere, 
that US anti-communist propaganda had been increased to a marked degree. In addition, 
ICA activities were directed to avoid any action or situation which would benefit the 
                                                
14 Ibid.  
15 Howard B. Schaffer, Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter Vietnam Hawk, Chapel Hill, 2003, pp 67-
68. 
16 Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies-India and the United States 1941-91, New Delhi, 1993, p145. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Operations Coordinating Board Report, Document 168, South Asia, Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1987. 
19 Ibid.  
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communists in Kerala20. The US instructed ICA and USIS to continue its anti-communist 
operations in Kerala until it was opposed by the Communist government in Kerala21. 
On 1 August 1957 the Department of State of the US sent an instruction to diplomatic 
missions in Madras, Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi to obtain as complete information 
as possible on, and ensure continuing coverage of, events in Kerala, with particular 
reference to economic, political and administrative programs and tactics of the 
Communist government, an assessment of opposition parties and their future  
capabilities, especially the Congress Party and detailed information on key political 
figures in the state22. The Embassy at New Delhi was made responsible for reporting on 
the attitude of Central government and of Congress Party headquarters towards Kerala. 
The Consulate General at Madras was invested with the primary responsibility of 
reporting all developments within Kerala. The Consulate General was asked to report on 
following matters23: 
 
1. Selective dispatch or telegraphic reporting only on most significant developments.  
2. Preparation of a weekly or bi-weekly classified roundup dispatch, including analytical 
comment on Kerala government. 
3. Continuing contribution to the Embassy on any important developments which should 
also be covered in greater detail under 2 above. 
4. Submission of a bi-weekly, unclassified dispatch reporting appropriate coverage of the 
press with respect to Kerala.  
 
The Department of State further instructed the diplomatic missions in Madras, 
Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi to observe the following measures24. 
 
1. The visit of American tourists in Kerala was to be demoted  
2. On courtesy calls, the US officials visiting or stationed in Kerala were to   deal all matters 
with the civil servants and to keep absolute minimum dealings with the Chief Minister, 
Communist Ministers or local level Communist officials. 
3. The diplomatic missions were to keep technical assistance, economic aid and other 
associated projects for Kerala under constant review. 
                                                
20 Instruction from the Department of State to the Diplomatic Missions in India, Document 171, South Asia, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1987.	
21 Operations Coordinating Board Report, Document 168, South Asia, Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United States 
Government  Printing Office, Washington, 1987. 
22 Instruction from the Department of State to the Diplomatic Missions in   India, Document 171, South 
Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1987. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.	
2017   |   The South Asianist 5 (1): 282-303   |   pg. 288 
4. The US economic aid, development of new projects, technical assistance and other 
related programmes in neighbouring Indian states were to be increased and fully 
publicized. 
5. The ICA and USIS personal in Kerala at present levels were to be maintained, seeking to 
replace departing personal. 
6. The American business men and other private interests planning to invest and expand 
business operations in Kerala were to be urged to proceed with caution in spite of 
Communist promises given to them. In the United States, appropriate US officials would 
take the initiative to ensure that US citizens with business interests in Kerala had the 
fullest information on conditions in Kerala and on problems faced by foreign business 
interests operating under Communist regimes in other parts of the world. 
 
The US Department of State calculated on 25 January 1958 that the future of 
moderate government in India might depend on economic progress in next few years 
and, failing such progress, the Communists might be able to follow up electoral victory 
in Kerala with gains in more populous and strategic provinces in 1962 elections25. The 
Department of State further believed that this might set in motion trend towards political 
extremism and regional separatism whose end results could be gradual Communist take-
over26. So, the economic empowerment of India was found as a panacea to combat the 
menace of Communism in India27. The US provided India with loans of 225 million 
dollars: 150 million from Exim Bank and 75 million from the new Development Loan 
Fund. It also granted additional wheat to meet drought emergency in addition to 
shipments under current PL 480 agreement. But the President of the US recognised that 
these alone would not meet all of India's needs28. So, the US government requested the 
countries of the 'free world', particularly Germany and Japan, to extend financial help to 
India to prevent the spread of Communism29.   
On 9 April 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, sent a note to Andrew J. 
Goodpaster, the Staff Secretary to the President, to personally deliver to Allen Dulles, 
Director of the CIA. The most important part of this note dealt with Kerala in India. The 
                                                
25 Telegram from the Department of the State to the Embassy in     Germany, Document 202, South and 
Southeast Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US 
Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Telegram from the Ambassador in India (Bunker) to the Department of State, Document 173, South Asia, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57, Vol. VIII, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1987. 
28 Telegram from the Department of the State to the Embassy in      Germany, Document 202, South and 
Southeast Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US 
Department of State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
29 Ibid. 
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President required the Embassy officials of the Department of State to prepare a 
operational plan of action in Kerala30. 
A dispatch from the US Embassy in India to the Department of State in Washington 
on 27 June 1958 stated that it had become clear over the previous year that the removal 
of the Communists from power in Kerala was related to the problem of combating 
Communism in India as a whole. It further stated that as the Department of State 
recognised, the key factors in the struggle were the government of India and the Congress 
Party31. It added that the government of India was more alert and exploiting more 
opportunities to discredit the Communists than the Congress Party, and it had been 
evinced in the action of four cabinet ministers, namely Pandit Pant, the Home Minister; 
Morarji Desai, the Finance Minister; A.K. Sen; the Law Minister and S.K. Patil, Transport 
and Communication Minister32. These leaders of the government of India convinced the 
US Embassy in India that the chief deterrent to Communism in India was satisfactory 
progress in economic development, and failure on this front would overshadow and 
render useless efforts in all other directions. 
The US Embassy in India believed that under prevailing circumstances it was 
desirable for the US to have more direct access to and contact with developments in 
Kerala. For this, the Embassy considered the possibility of establishing a consulate-cum-
reading room at Cochin. But the Embassy arrived at that their immediate interest could 
best be served by augmenting the staff of the Madras consulate by one officer with 
political and economic reporting experiences plus secretary and by providing him with 
sufficient travel funds to enable him to spend a portion of every month in the various 
parts of Kerala. The reasons for this recommendation were33. 
 
1. It could be implemented with minimum delay. Any negotiations with the government of India 
over the establishment of a consulate would have to be carefully timed and might be 
protracted. 
2. The establishment of a consulate in a Communist state would arise undue suspicion and 
especially in Congress-controlled Cochin. 
3. The location of consulate in Cochin would not serve the purpose of US government as Cochin 
was not an important listening post, politically, and travel to other parts of the state would be 
necessary. 
4. There was no ground to maintain a consulate in the event of the overthrow of the Communist 
regime in Kerala. 
                                                
30 Letter of Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the USA, dated 9 April 1958, Papers as President (Ann 
Whitman File), Box 16, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, 
Kansas, USA.	
31 Dispatch from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, Document 211, South and Southeast 
Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.	
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5. The establishment of a US consulate was likely to lead the establishment of Iron Curtain 
country consulates. 
6. The establishment of a consulate under a Communist regime was likely to pose the dilemma 
of increased trade requests threatening the basic policy of the US in Kerala.       
 
The embassy was also decided to provide Congress officials at national, state and 
local levels with first-hand experience in the working of the US political system and 
particularly the political parties. The Embassy further informed the Department of State 
that it would seize every opportunity to suggest specific measures serving the purpose of 
denying aid and comfort to the Communists in general and in Kerala in particular. The 
Embassy took the following steps for this purpose34. 
 
1. To discourage economic expansion that was likely to produce benefits to Kerala while the 
Communists in power. 
2. To discuss with the officials of the government of India with regard to its attitude towards the 
reported business offers of the Rumanians and Hungarians in Kerala 
3. To discuss the attitude of the leaders of government of India towards Communism in the light 
of continues praising of Communist ministry in Kerala by Srimali, the Education Minister and 
Dey, the Minister for Community Development. 
 
In a telegram from the US Embassy to the Department of State on 26 August 1958 
Ellsworth Bunker, the US Ambassador to India, expressed that their objective was to have 
a stable, non-communist, economically sound and favouring free world government in 
India which would give hope for building an Asian bulwark against challenges of 
international communism, especially Communist Chinese strength and ideology35.  
The National Intelligence Estimate on 2 September 1958 observed that the 
Communist Party would probably benefit most from a decline in Congress Party strength. 
It was further found that the Communist Party was better organized than any other 
opposition political parties and its members were more disciplined and attained a degree 
of respectability recently through the adoption of the policy of constitutional activity 
culminating significant gains in the elections in 195736. The Estimate further stated that 
the Communist Party alone would offer a clear-cut alternative to the old Congress way 
of doing things and even if the Second Five Year Plan was successful, the Communist 
Party would probably attract increasing popular support in West Bengal where poverty 
and unemployment would remain acute. The Estimate identified that the fertile grounds 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, Document 215, South and Southeast 
Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
36 National Intelligence Estimate, Document 217, South and Southeast Asia, Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
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of Communist Party were the ranks of the educated unemployed and the industrial 
working force in urban areas. The Estimate concluded that if the Communist Party was 
to loss control of Kerala after failing to provide good government and economic 
improvement, its chances of extending its influence elsewhere would probably be 
reduced and the Communists were unlikely to pose a serious threat to the Congress Party 
in 1962 national and assembly elections in India37.  
In conversation with C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, Morarji Desai, the Finance Minister of India, on 8 September 1958 said 
that the Communist threat in India was overemphasized in the US38. Addressing his 
remarks on the problem in Kerala, Desai stated that the people in Kerala were not 
basically Communists. According to him, the success of the Communists in Kerala was 
attributable to two factors: namely that on the whole, the people were better educated 
and therefore had high expectations which could not be fulfilled; also the Congress Party 
had become disorganized by internal squabbles and the well organized Communist Party 
had taken advantage of this. But now Desai was happy over growing disillusionment in 
Kerala with the Communist government since many of the intellectuals had found that 
their individual liberties were being threatened. He expressed the opinion that the 
Communist government would be defeated in Kerala in the next elections. He added that 
the Kerala experience was the most fortunate thing that could have happened to India 
because it pointed up the Communist threat and other Indian States would not be likely 
to follow Kerala’s example39. 
On 12 May 1959 the US Embassy in India assessed that the Soviet Russia would use 
trade to assist the economy and the Communist Party in Kerala and Russia would take 
whatever economic losses to accomplish these ends40. The Embassy further observed that 
economic aid to India must be strengthened to meet the dangers of Soviet economic 
offensive. 
The telegram sent from US Embassy in India to the Department of State on 28 May 
1959 showed that Embassy officials and Consulate General of Madras met at New Delhi 
on 25 May 1959 and discussed the proposed school-closure agitation in Kerala to begin 
in June 1959 and the consequent request to the President of India to intervene in Kerala 
when law and order break down. The meeting supposed that the agitation based on 
communalism would begin with the formulation of a charge-sheet by the opposition 
                                                
37 Ibid.		
38 Memorandum of a Conversation of Department of State, Document   219, South and Southeast Asia, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State,  United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992 
39 Ibid.  
40 Paper Prepared in the Embassy in India, Document 228, South and Southeast Asia, Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1958-60, Vol.  XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
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parties as a basis demanding the ouster of the Communist government in Kerala41. The 
meeting further observed that both the Congress High Command and the KPCC seemed 
to have adopted greater realism and agreed that Communist Party in Kerala was 
dangerous to India and should be ousted from power in Kerala42. The meeting made to 
clear that All-India Congress Party leadership was more conscious than KPCC to 
overthrow the Communist government in Kerala. The meeting foresaw that the 
Communist government would face the most serious challenges during June-July 1959 
from agitations which might easily lead to  violence that the Communist ministry would 
unable to control and leave way open to the imposition of President’s rule43. The meeting 
required Thomas W. Simons, the Consul General in Madras, to lend US assistance to 
non-Communist government in Kerala to be newly formed on the fall of Communist 
administration. The US assistance to the new government would be supply of food grains 
via PL 480; increased trade in such products as corn, cashew, pepper in order to 
strengthen indigenous industries; increased participation of US private investment in 
medium-size industries such as rayon, paper, rubber manufacture, sugar and tapioca 
plants; and US financial assistance for impact projects in the area44. The meeting 
concluded that possibilities would be explored with selected government of India and 
diplomatic personnel especially from NATO countries for effective and immediate 
cooperation with new non-Communist government of Kerala to resolve some Kerala’s 
basic economic problems. 
The government of the US offered financial assistance to start the liberation struggle45. 
The assistance was given through the Churches and other organizations in Kerala to 
remove the Communist ministry through the liberation struggle46. Ellsworth Bunker, the 
US Ambassador to India, reviewed the liberation struggle in Kerala in June 1959. He 
expressed doubt that this would result in the over throw of the Communist government 
in Kerala, feeling that the action was somewhat premature, though it was difficult to 
foresee how something of this kind, once started, would end up47. He observed that the 
new Congress Party leader, R. Sankar, was more of a practical politician.  
 
                                                
41 Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, Document 231, South and Southeast 
Asia, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of 
State, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992. 
42 Ibid.		
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Email Reply from V.R. Krishna Iyer, 31 January 2014. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Memorandum of a Conversation of Department of State, Document 233, South and Southeast Asia, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-60, Vol. XV, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992.	
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Liberation struggle 
The genesis of the liberation struggle may be traced back to the very day the Communists 
assumed power in the state. However, it became a popular agitation only from 12 June 
1959 with school closure demanding the dismissal of the first Communist ministry in 
Kerala. In the struggle, all the major opposition political parties: Congress Party, Praja 
Socialist Party, Muslim League and Revolutionary Socialist Party and the community 
organisations- Catholic Church and Nair Service Society-joined together under the 
leadership of Mannath Padmanabhan, the NSS leader, with the support of All India 
Congress Committee. Each group had their own grievances against the Communist 
government.  
The main plight of the Catholic Church was Kerala Education Act of 1958. The Kerala 
Education Act tried to impose the control of the government on the private schools run 
by government grant. The Catholic Church owned majority of private schools in Kerala 
and they demanded the withdrawal of the controversial provisions of the Kerala 
Education Act. The Nair Service Society was unsatisfied with the Kerala Agrarian 
Relations Bill. The bill aimed to take over the excess land from the landed magnets for 
distributing among the landless. The Nairs were the main landowning community in 
Kerala. So the Nair Service Society decided to strike against the government as the chief 
protector of the interests of the Nairs.  But the Communist ministry did not heed the 
demands of the Catholic Church and the Nair Service Society. When they realised that 
the pressure and persuasion were not enough to resist the Communist onslaught on them, 
the Christians and Nairs were left with no other choice but to decide an all-out political 
war to oust the Communists from power. Soon the agitations of the Catholic Church and 
the Nair Service Society and the opposition political parties merged into one and they 
adopted the non-heard extra-constitutional method of liberation struggle or vimochana 
samaram to oust the Communist government from power.  
The Muslim League had not even minor grievances against the Communist 
government. In fact, it disagreed with some of the charges levelled by other parties against 
the government, particularly in regard to the reservations in services and the appointment 
of a Muslim to the State Public Service Commission. However, the Muslim League joined 
the liberation struggle to get recognition as an all-India organisation from the Congress 
Party48.  
In Kerala, the Communist government provided a stable government as there had 
never been before. The short period of seven years between 1949 and 1956 had 
witnessed the rise and fall of five ministers - four Congress and one PSP - in Travancore–
Cochin. These ministries were the product of political instability, groupism, and internal 
strife. Now these parties were denied opportunity to come to power again because of the 
stability of the Communist government. It antagonized the opposition political parties. 
                                                
48	The Hindu, 31 July 1959.	
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The educational and land reforms introduced by the Communist government were 
actually the measures the previous Congress and PSP regimes tried to implement. But this 
did not materialize because of the stiff opposition from the Catholic Church and the 
landed magnates. These vested interests had no shame in going to any extent to protect 
their interests including the unseating of the government in power. On coming to power 
the Communist government thus introduced the educational and land reforms which the 
previous regimes failed to implement. It irked not only the vested interests but also the 
Congress Party and PSP which formed the previous governments. The Congress Party and 
the Praja Socialist Party believed that the successful implementation of the educational 
and agrarian reforms would increase the popularity of the Communist government 
among the teachers and the peasants, and it would stand in the way of the coming of the 
Congress Party and PSP again to power. It forced, the Congress Party and the PSP would 
align with the Catholic Church and the NSS to prevent the implementation of the 
educational and agrarian reforms. 
Initially the RSP supported the Communist government but later turned against it49. 
The only complaint the RSP had against the government was in regard to its labour policy. 
The RSP felt that the government had followed a systematic policy of encouraging only 
unions sponsored by the Communists and adopted a completely hostile attitude towards 
other unions.  
This was for the first time in India that a non-Congress Party emerged as a majority 
party on the floor of the legislative assembly and formed a government. It surprised and 
shocked the all India Congress leadership. That is why the AICC extended support to the 
KPCC to agitate with other opposition political parties and community organisations 
against the Communist government in the form of a 'liberation struggle'. Had the AICC 
not been interested in ousting the democratically elected Communist government, it 
would have instructed the KPCC to withdraw from the agitation and reprimand the errant 
Congressmen.  
When the 'liberation struggle' started, the Nehru government did not give moral and 
political protection to the Kerala government. The least that Nehru as Prime Minister 
could have done was to condemn the movement which was meant to paralyse the 
administration. As the government of Kerala was a part of the administration of the whole 
of India, and as such under the constitution, they were entitled to protections. While 
Nehru expressed himself against the agitation in Bombay, and violent activities against 
the Punjab government, regarding Kerala, his attitude had been one of silent eloquence 
or of condemnation of the Communist government50. In Uttar Pradesh, the birth place of 
Nehru, all the opposition, and the one-third of the Congress members, rallied together 
against the government resulting in the lack of majority support of the government in 
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the legislature, and Nehru remained moot on these developments51. Instead of making 
adequate measures to contain the agitation, Nehru dubbed it as a mass upsurge. This, in-
turn, only helped the agitation to become a formidable one. This was a grossly 
discriminatory attitude.  
Nehru’s appeal of non-violence in the agitation might be interpreted as an indirect 
approval of the agitation of Congressmen in Kerala against the Communist government. 
Moreover, Nehru did not offer any comment on the open alliance of Congressmen in 
Kerala with the NSS and Catholic Church. Nehru characterised the liberation struggle in 
Kerala as a civil war just before the dismissal of the ministry. But the agitation in Kerala 
was not a civil war in the true sense of the term, as there was no struggle between two 
groups of people. 
Nehru was found guilty of not taking tough action against the Congressmen for 
promoting violence against the Communist government. Had Nehru intervened earlier 
and warned against the participation of KPCC in the struggle to oust the Communist 
government, the liberation struggle would have failed. This was because the KPCC was 
the main force behind the agitation in Kerala, and R. Sankar spoke not merely as the 
President of the KPCC but also as one of the warlords of the vimochana samaram52. The 
liberators had sound financial backing and received economic support from Christian 
organisations in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada as well as West Germany53. 
Father Joseph Vadakkan, one of the main forces behind the liberation struggle, later 
confessed that he had known several persons receiving lakhs of dollars from United 
States, in order to fund the liberation struggle54. Industrialists and capitalists made their 
contributions through the churches55, and one Mannath Padmanabhan, alone spent as 
much as fifty lakh rupees on the liberation movement56.  
The Communist government was also equally responsible for the agitation. Taking 
examples from Soviet Russia, the first Communist ministry in Kerala used its power to 
spread Communist ideology through the governmental machinery. The appointments of 
the people’s committees in order to supplement the activities of the officialdom reduced 
the distance between the party workers and government in running the administration. 
The focus of these committees was the protection of party interests. Even school children 
were not spared. Through the newly revised text books, the government tried to inculcate 
school children with the importance of Communism and the achievements of the 
Communist countries. This infuriated the Catholic Church. The formation of cell courts 
with Communist men to decide criminal cases went against the principle of natural 
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justice. It attracted the wrath of the non-Communists. Again, the government supported 
Communist culprits, and it attracted reverse remarks even from the judiciary, on multiple 
occasions, against the government. Worst of all, the promotion of Communist trade 
unions by the government irked other trade unions and managers. It only swelled the 
number of liberators.   
All these did not mean that other Congress-ruled states were free from similar 
charges57. Nor did the previous Congress and PSP regimes in Travancore-Cochin. But 
there was a difference between other Congress-ruled states and the first Communist 
government in Kerala. As other Congress-ruled states enjoyed the support and backing 
of the Union government, no liberation struggle would be successful through the 
intervention of the Union government under Article 356 of the Constitution of India. But 
in Kerala, the liberators thought that Central intervention was possible.  
The failure of the Communist government rested in the fact that it did not turn up for 
a round table conference with the Christian managements and Catholic Church in the 
initial stages of the introduction of the Education Bill. The government invited the 
managements and church for a conference only at the insistence of Nehru in the first 
week of July 1959 when the agitation for toppling the ministry reached at a stage which 
could not be suppressed through a mere conference. On the Kerala Agrarian Relations 
Bill, the government would have prepared the bill so as to avoid the wrath of the small 
holders of Travancore.   
The extreme anti-Communist feeling was propagated based on caste and religion by 
the opponents of the Communist government. The government could not effectively 
suppress it. It brought even the sympathisers against the government. The Communist 
ministry also failed to prove beyond doubt certain allegations levelled against the 
government. The opposition parties used it as a powerful weapon to oust the ministry.  
The government stopped the usage of preventive detention and it was not used even 
once in Kerala under Communist regime58. The government failed to take legal action 
against those who contributed inflammatory speeches, cooked stories and articles. It 
spread the message that the government was weak. 
The Communist Party itself attested to the failures of its government, and in many 
respects making the liberation struggle unavoidable. The Fifth State Conference of the 
party, held in Trissur in November 1959, held the view that if the Communist government 
paid attention to certain issues the volume of the liberation struggle would have been 
reduced59. The conference observed that the government failed to bring to its side even 
the beneficiaries of the administration of Communist ministry, particularly teachers, small 
holders, and common man, and this could be gauged from the Education Bill agitation 
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(1957), students’ boat strike agitation (1958) and liberation struggle (1959). It stated that 
in all these struggles, the main attention of the government was the adoption of same 
methods the opposition used-suppression of struggle and the government failed to adopt 
reconciliation to bring the opponents to their sides and its uncompromising attitude was 
somewhat changed only when the liberation struggle reached its zenith. The conference 
added that that is why the government could not differentiate between the Christian 
Church and the Christians interested in the protection of the rights of the teachers60. 
The Fifth Kerala State Conference further expressed that delay in the distribution of 
excess land, formation of fisheries cooperative societies, the passage of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act and the Industrial Relations Bill, improper administration of forests, lack 
of government support to middle and small holders to start small scale industries and the 
maladministration of the department of education distanced people from the 
government61. The conference expressed the hope that if all these maladies were 
addressed properly, a large section of people would have sided with the government. 
The conference concluded that the government failed to check agitations and struggles 
properly. 
 
The USA and the dismissal of the ministry 
In his conversation with Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ellsworth 
Bunker, the US Ambassador to India, on 19 June 1959 stated that he thought the Congress 
High Command had been correct in following a policy of permitting the Communist 
government to remain in office to commit mistakes and to demonstrate the people of 
Kerala that it was unable to fulfil its campaign promises62. The Ambassador further said 
that he believed the current agitation in Kerala for the overthrow of the Communist 
ministry in Kerala was premature in as much as the Congress Party in Kerala was not yet 
able to form an alternative government63. He added that there was some hope that the 
new President of the KPCC, R. Sankar, would be able to reorganize and revitalize the 
Kerala Congress. Bunker felt that Indira Gandhi was a considerable improvement as the 
President of the Congress Party over his predecessor, U.N. Dhebar. 
On 25 June 1959, Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, discussed developments in 
Kerala during his intelligence briefing at the 411th meeting of the National Security 
Council; saying: 
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Agitation against the Communist government of Kerala State in India has continued to be 
quite strong. Fortunately for us, the Communist government in that state had made a number 
of grave mistakes. They had put 6,300 people in prison and fourteen had been killed. Nehru 
had gone down to Kerala to look the situation over. He has the theoretical power to take 
over the State government but he is obviously loath to do so if he can avoid the step.  We 
do not know precisely what Nehru will do but our guess is that he will do nothing. If this 
guess is correct, it is very unlikely that local agitation alone will prove sufficient to oust the 
Communist government. Meanwhile, these developments have posed a very grave issue for 
the entire Congress Party in India. The party is split down the middle as to whether to throw 
out the Kerala Communists or not.64 
 
On 9 July 1959 Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, again discussed the Kerala situation 
during his intelligence briefing at the 412th meeting of the National Security Council. He 
expressed: 
 
As for the campaign against the Communist government in Kerala State in India, it is gaining 
steadily in intensity. Meanwhile Nehru is still trying to decide whether he should throw out the 
Communist government and institute presidential government from New Delhi. Nehru obviously 
does not wish to do this but may ultimately be forced to take the step.65 
 
The Intelligence Bureau in India served as the agent of the CIA, and the main source 
of information on Kerala affairs. The Hindu reported on 18 April 1957 that the 
Intelligence Bureau had strengthened its service in Kerala once the Communists came to 
power. B.N. Mullik, then Director of IB, was against the Communist government in Kerala 
and played the central role in taking the decision of the dismissal of the ministry. His 
biography titled “My Years with Nehru 1948-64” is a testimony to that. 
The IB had very good organization in Kerala under M. Gopalakrishna Menon and 
the agency came to know of every move of the party and the government as soon as it 
was planned. When Pandit Pant, the Union Home Minister, asked about the intervention 
of the Centre in Kerala affairs on 5 July 1959, B.N. Mullik answered that it would be 
better to let the government of Kerala collapse by the force of events, rather than by any 
action of the Central government66. Both the Home Minister and the Prime Minister 
agreed with the view tendered by B.N. Mullik. 
On 13 July 1959 E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the Chief Minister of Kerala, categorically 
stated that the Communist government would not resign and seek fresh elections in view 
of the present agitation67. The Communist Party also reiterated the same view68. It forced 
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B.N. Mullik to change his stance. By 18 July 1959, he came to the view that time had 
come for the Central government to intervene and he expressed it to the Home Minister69. 
But the Home Secretary, B.N. Jha, felt that no Central action should be taken, as the state 
government had its majority in the assembly intact and no constitutional crisis had 
developed. 
On 19 July 1959, the Home Minister asked B.N. Mullik to prepare a note giving the 
entire history of the Kerala struggle and proving the necessity of Central action. B.N. 
Mullik prepared the note and produced it on the very next day before the Home Minister, 
Pandit Pant. The Home Minister went through the note very carefully and made several 
corrections and improvements and then asked B.N. Mullik to take that report to the Prime 
Minister which he did. The Prime Minister also went through the note carefully and 
ultimately made the laconic remark that probably Central action had become 
necessary70.  
On 20 July 1959 B.N. Mullik reiterated the Home Minister that the Central action in 
Kerala should not be delayed and certainly this action must be taken before 9 August 
195971. The liberators planned a mammoth picketing of state secretariat on this day72. 
Mullik cautioned that the picketing would cause massive bloodshed and disorder in 
Kerala. However, B.N. Jha, the Home Secretary, still maintained his opposition to Central 
take-over in Kerala. On 22 July 1959 a charge sheet against the government of Kerala 
was prepared by B.N. Mullik and A.K. Sen, the Law Minister, at the instance of Home 
Minister. Then the Home Minister asked to B.N. Mullik to send the charge-sheet to the 
Governor of Kerala, so that he could have the facts before him and then come to his own 
decision whether Central action was necessary73. But no move came from the Governor 
till 26 July 1959. 
Therefore, on 26 July 1959 the Home Minister asked the Home Secretary, B.N. Jha, 
who was not in favour of intervention, to ring up the Governor by telephone in the 
presence of B.N. Mullik, so that Jha should not sound indecisive. Jha telephoned to the 
Governor in the presence of B.N. Mullik in the course of which the latter told to the 
Governor that he should not delay his report based on his own judgment any more. On 
the same day Jha met the Prime Minister as per the instruction given by the Home 
Minister, Pandit Pant, and he returned with a sense of satisfaction and said to B.N. Mullik 
that though they were all ‘action-wallas’, the Prime Minister had told him that no decision 
had been taken on any Central action on Kerala74. That evening Pandit Pant, the Union 
Home Minister, asked to B.N. Mullik as to whether he was present during Jah’s talks with 
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the Governor and whether the Governor understood the trend properly, and he sounded 
in the affirmative. 
B.N. Mullik met the Prime Minister and the Home Minister next day and produced 
the evidence that Communist ministry in Kerala itself wanted Central take-over and urged 
them that there should be no more hesitation in dismissing the government75. But E.M.S. 
Namboodiripad himself rejected it later76. The assessment of political trends made by the 
IB was more acceptable to Nehru than that of the Congress Party because the later was 
bound to be coloured or biased77. The Prime Minister agreed that action had to be taken 
and B.N. Mullik was asked to talk to the Home Minister about it. 
On 29 July 1959 B.N. Mullik met the Home Minister and the former was asked by 
the latter to verify whether the Governor was sending the report. B.N. Mullik checked it 
and found that the Governor was due to dispatch the report by that afternoon’s air service. 
If so the report would reach New Delhi only on the 30th morning of July 1959. This was 
not satisfactory to Pandit Pant and he wanted the full verbatim contents of the report that 
very night of 29 July 195978. So B.N. Mullik asked Ravindran, Officer of IB at Madras, to 
obtain this report with the consent of the Governor during the halt of the plane at Madras, 
open it and communicate the contents to B.N. Mullik on telephone and then dispatch it 
by the same plane79. From seven to eight that evening Ravindran dictated the report from 
Madras on secraphone to B.N. Mullik. In this way, the entire report of the governor, 
consisting of about thirty pages, recommending the supersession of the government of 
Kerala, was relayed on the telephone. By 10 p.m., B.N. Mullik produced the report before 
Pandit Pant, the Home Minister. 
As soon as the formal report of the Governor arrived on 30 July 1959, orders 
dismissing the Communist government in Kerala and its takeover by the Central 
government, were issued and these orders became effective from 31 July 1959. 
 
Conclusion 
The government of the United States feared that the successful working of the Communist 
ministry in Kerala would cause Communist victories in the forthcoming general elections 
to the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies favourable to international Communism. 
In response, the US beefed up its anti-Communist operations in India in general and 
Kerala in particular. The CIA was tasked with disrupting this possibility, and largely 
operated through the Indian Intelligence Bureau and the Congress Party at the Centre. 
The main strategy of the CIA was to discredit the Communist government in Kerala and 
to publicise that the Communist government in Kerala failed to provide political stability 
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and economic improvement so as to check the spread of Communism in the region. The 
US calculated that the main force behind the growth of Communism in India was its 
economic backwardness. Consequently, the US government started the process of 
economic empowerment of India through several methods. During this time the 
opposition political parties and the community organizations started the liberation 
struggle to oust the Communist ministry and CIA monetarily helped the struggle. But, the 
CIA found that the local agitations alone would not topple the ministry and operations at 
higher level were necessary. The CIA saw this higher level in the Intelligence Bureau and 
the Congressmen at Centre. Even though Nehru stubbornly opposed the intervention of 
the Union in Kerala, he became prey to the larger conspiracy hatched by the IB and 
Congressmen at the Centre. 
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